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Will Parties Take to Tahkim?:  The Use of 







For devout Muslims, law and religion intertwine, forming a 
comprehensive system that expects compliance from Islam’s adherents.  
Islamic law first emerged in countries in the Middle East, which had either 
Islamic governments or a major Muslim population.  In contrast to Islamic 
law, the common law system that developed in the United States provides 
for a clear separation of church and state.  In recent times, private parties 
have sought to enforce contracts governed by Islamic law in U.S. courts.  
This article examines some recent cases on this issue and looks at how the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws may provide guidance to courts 
and parties in future cases.  It then considers whether the use of Islamic 
arbitration, takhim, which already has a long and distinguished history 
within Islam, may provide another mechanism for parties to have their 
contracts and disputes governed by Islamic law within the United States.  
In this context, this article summarizes the positive development of another 
form of religious arbitration tribunals, the Jewish rabbinical arbitration 
courts, the Beth din.  The Beth din may serve as a valuable example for 
how Islamic arbitration tribunals can develop in the United States.  
Part I of this article provides an introduction to Islamic law from the 
time of the Prophet Mohammad until the end of the Ottoman Empire, 
describing important Islamic legal traditions and schools of thought.  Part II 
of this article provides examples of cases in the United States where parties 
sought to use Islamic law.  Part III examines the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws and its application to Islamic law.  Part IV proposes a 
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I. Islamic Law: A Brief Introduction 
 
The word "Islam" comes from the root word salam, which means 
peace.1  Islam, pronounced al-Islam in Arabic, translates to “the act of 
submission to God.”2  Muslims believe that God, through the archangel 
Gabriel, revealed the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an, to Prophet 
Mohammad.3  There are two main sources of Islamic law:  the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah.  The Qur’an contains legal principles, which form the primary 
source of Islamic law.  These principles serve as a guide to Muslims on 
how to act in their daily lives, in terms of moral and legal duties.4   
The Sunnah,5 in turn, constitutes the second main source of Islamic 
law and contains explanations of Prophet Mohammad’s acts, in which he 
applied legal principles to particular cases.6  The Hadith, meaning the 
Prophet’s traditions and sayings, “is the verbal report of the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, which is the second primary source of Islamic legislation.”7  
Three different kinds of Sunan exist:8  Sunnat al-Fi‘li, the actual 
actions of Prophet Mohammad;9 Sunnat al-Qawli, the “[t]raditions enjoined 
by words;”10 and Sunnat al-Ima, the actions of others approved ex post 
facto, or not disapproved of, by Prophet Mohammad.11 
There are also three different types of ahadith.12  The first type is 
hadith qudsi, a term used for a “holy or divine hadith.”13  In a hadith qudsi, 
                                                
1 S. MOSTAFA MOHAGHEGH DAMAD, PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND ISLAMIC LAWS 1 (2005) (noting that salam can be defined as “peace, 
safety, well-being and health”). 
2 Id. (stating that Aslama, the past tense of salm, means “he submitted”). 
3 Id.   
4 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 11 (1964) (noting that Prophet Muhammad 
acted as a judge of Islamic law in his community, also known as hakam); see also id. at 11-12 
(indicating that some moral and legal duties listed in the Qur’an are to “arbitrate with justice, not offer 
bribes, to give true evidence, and to give full weight and measure.  Contracts are [also] safeguarded by 
commands to put them in writing, to call witnesses, to give securities . . . when there is no scribe 
available . . . or . . . to fulfill one’s contracts and, especially, to return a trust or deposit (amana) to its 
ower”); see also Qur’an, sura ii. 282 f. (cf. xxiv. 33) – ii. 177; iii. 76; iv. 58; v. I; viii. 27; ix. 4, 7; xvi. 
91 f.; xvii. 34; xxiii. 8; lxx. 32.  
5 DAMAD, supra note 1, at 26 (relaying that the plural of Sunnah is Sunan). 
6 Id. at 24-25 (noting that the traditions of the Prophet are a divine source, just as is the Qur’an). 
7 SCHACHT, supra note 4, at 298 glossary (stating that the plural of hadith is ahadith); see also DAMAD, 
supra note 1, at 25 (“[t]he reports of the words and deeds of the Holy Prophet are compiled in various 
books of Hadith, Siyar, and Sunan, from which the science of the Sunnah is derived). 




12 DAMAD, supra note 1, at 463 (listing the three different types of ahadith as hadith qudsi, hadith 
sahih, and al-hadith al-maudu‘ah).  
13 Id. 
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the speaker of the saying is Allah instead of Prophet Mohammad.14  The 
second type is hadith sahih, a term used for a trusted tradition.15  For hadith 
sahih, the origin of the hadith is not in question and does not contradict the 
Qur’an.16  The third type is al-hadith al-maudu‘ah, a term used for a 
fabricated hadith.17  Al-hadith al-maudu‘ah is considered forged and is 
incorrectly attributed to Prophet Mohammad.18 
Finally, two other important sources of Islamic law are ijma‘, 
meaning consensus, and qiyas, meaning analogy.19  Ijma‘ is an “'agreement 
of the Jurists among the followers of Prophet Mohammad in a particular 
age on a question of law.’”20  The methodological process of ijma‘ is 
murky and surrounded by disagreement.  Some of these issues include the 
following:  the exact procedure to form ijma‘; the necessary number of 
jurists; whether the vote should be majority or unanimous; whether the 
reasoning should precede jurists’ decisions; and whether the jurists should 
sit together when forming ijma‘.21  Some jurists use the method of qiyas, 
which is defined as “pronouncing a new provision of law on the basis of 
analogical deduction from the Qur’an, the Traditions of the Prophet or 
some authentic report regarding the ijma‘ of the Companions of the Prophet 
on the provision of law.”22  This source of law, too, is obscure and disputed 
as to its nature, character, and scope.23   
In addition, Islamic law has several secondary sources, including 
justice, equity, good conscience, judicial decisions, and ‘urf, which means 
custom.24  Pre-Islamic era customs may be implemented within the Islamic 
legal system if they do not contradict the primary sources of Islamic law.25  
As for justice, equity, and good conscience, they underlie the foundations 
of religion and law.26  Given Islam’s wide acceptance of judicial decisions 
made by the consensus (ijma') of mufti(s),27 such a decision might be 
considered a judicial precedent.28 
                                                
14 Id. (stating that a hadith qudsi usually refers to God, or has God speaking in the first person and the 
verses are inspired directly by God, not passed down through Archangel Gabriel).  
15 Id. 
16 Id. (indicating that a hadith sahih, also does not contradict “well-established text[s]” of Islam). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 463. 
19 Id. at 29-31. 
20 Id. at 29. 
21 Id. at 30. 
22 Id. at 31. 
23 Id. at 31. 
24 Id. at 33-34. 
25 See id. at 33. 
26 See id. at 34. 
27 Id. 
28 See id. 
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Islamic law is also known as Shari‘ah law.29  Shar’, which means 
road, is the root of the word Shari‘ah:  the “road that men and women must 
follow in life.”30  Islamic law differs from other systems of jurisprudence 
because its principles include an inherent sense of morality.  Islamic law 
guides its constituents by providing them with information on how to 
handle their daily lives.31  Additionally, the way Islamic law is formed 
makes it different from other jurisprudential systems.  As stated previously, 
Islamic law is comprised of the Qur’an and hadith as well as qiyas and 
ijma‘.32  Due to the many different components of Islamic law, there exist 
numerous schools of Islamic law and lines of legal reasoning; these 
independent schools of thought are also known as ijtihad.33   
Islamic law categorizes its laws into two groups based on individual 
acts:  recommended and reprehensible.34  Recommended actions, as the 
name suggests, are not required, but are considered morally good.35  For 
instance, helping the poor represents a recommended action.36  
Reprehensible actions, in contrast, while not forbidden, are looked upon 
with distaste by Allah.37  An example of such an act would be proposing to 
a woman who is engaged.38 
The aforementioned laws and customs developed as follows.  The 
two main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the hadith, date back to 
the time of Prophet Mohammed, 609-32 C.E.39  They provide the basic 
rules and foundation for Islamic law.40  After Mohammed died in 632 C.E., 
the Islamic world entered into the reign of the four Rightly Guided 
Caliphs.41  During this time period, ijma‘ and qiyas became two additional 
sources of Islamic law.42  Also, a new set of rules emerged and 
supplemented the body of Islamic law.43  The first rule stated that the city 
of Medina, in an area now part of Saudi Arabia, would be modeled after the 
                                                
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. at 1 (relaying that Shari‘ah is divided into ibadat, rules for worship, and mu’amilat, rules for 
transactions). 
31 See id. at 3 (giving an example of how the Qur’an encourages people to fulfill contracts because it is 
their moral duty; an unfulfilled contract equates to disbelief in Islam). 
32 See id. at 4. 
33 See id. (listing differences in Ijtihad between Sunni and Shia Muslims.) 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 8-9. 
40 Id. at 9. 
41 See id. at 9-10 (noting that this period lasted from 632-62 A.D., and during this time the Caliphate 
passed from Abu Bakr, to ‘Umar, to Uthamn, and finally to Ali).  
42 See id. at 10. 
43 Id. 
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Persian administrative system.44  The second one asserted that temporary 
marriage would be abolished as well as a “certain type of pilgrimage to 
Mecca that had been permitted at the time of the Holy Prophet.”45  Sunnis 
accepted this decree, but the minority Shias rejected it.46 
From 622-794 C.E., the Umayyad Dynasty held the caliphate.47  
During this period, the office of qadi(s) became the administration of 
justice and the “office of the clerk of the court” also known as the sherif.48  
Throughout this time, the Umayyads spread misrepresentations of the 
Prophet’s sayings as a way to gain their constituents’ support.49  These 
falsehoods led Muslims to seek the help of Islamic legal scholars, who 
were recognized as independent and wise individuals.50  These Islamic 
scholars are known as mufti(s).51 
The next significant period of Islamic legal development occurred 
during the Abbasid era, 745-1272 C.E.52  During this period, the Office of 
Chief Justice, or Qadi-al-qudat, was established.53  The Chief Justice acted 
as legal advisor to the caliph with the sole right to appoint and dismiss 
judges.54  A police force, or shurtah, was also created.55  Furthermore, the 
Abbasids created a court of grievances, or al-nazar fi al-mazalim, which 
reviewed the jurists’ opinions and ensured their compliance with Islamic 
law and justice.56  Abbasids also attempted to compile the traditions of the 
Holy Prophet.57  
Throughout history, scholars gathered the hadith into several 
different books, including the most famous ones:  Sahih-i-Bukhari, Sahih-i-
Muslim, Sahih-i-Tirmadhi, Sahih-i-Nisayi, Sahih-i-sajastani, and Sahih-i-
ibn majeh.58  Shi‘ite scholars compiled their own books, such as al-Kafi, 
Man-la-yahduruhul-al-faqih, Kitab al-Tahdhib, and Kitab al-Istirbsar.59   




47 See id. at 10-11 (stating that Mu‘awiyah was the first Caliph under the Umayyad Dynasty, which held 
great power for more than 80 years but ultimately crumbled after a civil war in 794 A.D.). 
48 Id. at 11 (noting that Mohammad acted as a judge during his lifetime; the Caliphs also acted as judges 
but additionally appointed other judges in major cities). 
49 See id. at 12. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. at 13. 
52 See id.  
53 Id. at 14. 
54 Id. at 14. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 15. 
59 Id. 
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During 1283-1923 C.E., the Ottoman Empire established the office 
of Grand Mufti and codified the Islamic law.60  Thereafter, the secular 
courts adjudicated commercial and trade disputes while the Shari‘ah courts 
resolved all other issues.61  Ottoman caliphs codified Islamic law62 in an 
1850 commercial code and an 1877 civil code.63 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic countries began a 
process of modernization in line with the European legal system.64  
However, they did not want to trade Islamic law for European law.65  This 
modernization, though it did not affect religious rituals or personal status 
laws, modified some areas like commercial and tax law.66  Certain 
countries still chose to follow “Traditional Islamic Law.”67 
Each school of Islamic law solves legal issues in a different 
manner.68  The main schools of Islamic law among the Sunnis include 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali.  The Shi‘ite and Khawarij also have 
several non-official schools of law.69  The Hanafi school famously places 
more importance on qiyas to solve legal issues rather than on the traditions 
of the Prophet.70  The Maliki school focuses on the traditions of the 
Prophet, along with “the rule of discretion (Istislah).”71  The Maliki school 
also relies on the practices of the people from Medina, dating back to the 
time of the Prophet and the school’s founder, Malik Ibn Anas.72  The Shafi’i 
school supports the traditions of the Prophet, qiyas, and istislah, but 
opposes preference (istihsan).73  The Hanbali school focuses first on the 
Qur’an, and then on the traditions of the Prophet.74  Out of all the schools, 






                                                
60 Id. at 463. 
61 See id. at 16. 
62 Id. (relaying that this reformation is referred to as Tanzimat). 
63 Id. (indicating that the civil code was known as Majallah-al-Ahkam-al-‘Adliyah). 
64 See id. at 17. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 18. 
68 See id. at 18. 
69 See id.    
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 19. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 20. 
75 See id. 
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II. Islamic Law in American Courts 
 
As seen above, Islam is not only a religion, but also a jurisprudential 
system dating back to the time of the Prophet Mohammed, 609-632 C.E.  It 
is one of the most important legal regimes in the world today.  The cases 
discussed below serve as examples of how Islamic law, as a choice of law 
in private contracts, has been handled in the United States legal system.  
 
A. Awad v. Ziriax 
 
In 2010, Oklahoma voters sought to amend their state constitution, 
and on November 2, 2010, State Question 755 was adopted.76  State 
Question 755, also known as the “Save Our State Amendment,”77 would 
amend Article 7, Section 1 of the Oklahoma State Constitution to include a 
provision stating:  
 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, 
when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and 
adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States 
Code, the federal regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, 
established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules 
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of 
another state of the United States provided the law of the 
other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial 
decisions.  The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of 
other nations or cultures.  Specifically the courts shall not 
consider international law or Sharia Law.  The provisions 
of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
                                                
76 See Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like it 
that Bar State Courts From Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011) 
(stating that on November 2, 2010, by a 70.08 percent majority, Oklahoma voters adopted State 
Question 755); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2012). [hereinafter 
Awad 1] (“State Question No. 755, which was on Oklahoma’s November 2, 2010 ballot, provides:  This 
measure amends the State Constitution.  It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state.  It 
would amend article VII, section 1.  It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases.  
It forbids courts from considering or using international law.  It forbids courts from considering or using 
Sharia law.  International law is also known as the law of nations.  It deals with the conduct of 
international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes.  It deals with 
their relationship with each other.  It also deals with some of their relationships with persons.  The law 
of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include 
international agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia law is Islamic law.  It is based on two principal 
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”). 
77 See Okla. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (calling section C of the Oklahoma Constitution the “Save Our State 
Amendment”). 
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respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first 
impression.78 
 
On November 4, 2010, a Muslim American, Muneer Awad filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma 
(the “District of Oklahoma”) seeking a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to prevent the results of the November 2, 2010 
election from being certified and thereby taking effect.79  Awad was the 
Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic Relations, 
Oklahoma Branch.80  The defendant in the action was the Board of 
Elections for Oklahoma.81  Awad challenged the constitutionality of State 
Question 755, asserting that a prohibition from considering Sharia law 
violates the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.82  
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment say 
that “[C]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”83  State Question 755 only 
mentions Sharia law, and no other religion or religious law. 
                                                
78 See Okla. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2012) 
(No. 5:10-CV-01186) (indicating that the Amendment’s text prohibits state courts from applying other 
state court laws, if these laws include Sharia law, and from considering Sharia law themselves); see 
also CHARLES LE GAI EATON, ISLAM AND THE DESTINY OF MAN 166 (1985) (defining the word Sharia 
as “‘road or highway[,]’” referring to a road wild animals walk down to drink from—‘the road which 
leads to where the waters of life flow inexhaustibly.’”); id. at 167 (stating that the Qur’anic message 
and Prophet Mohammed’s example form Sharia law, a body of living law, which proscribes guidance 
for Muslims on how to live together, is not solely revealed law, but is made also from the sayings and 
actions of Mohammed, which form the hadiths); DAMAD, supra note 1, at 2 (defining Sharia as the 
“road men and women must follow in life” and Sharia law as divided into two sections, ‘ibadat and 
mu’amilat. ‘Ibadat concerns worship and mu’amilat concerns transactions, such as economic or social, 
or wills in the case of Awad).   
79 See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305; see also Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-
CV-01186) (indicating the urgency with which the temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction were needed, because the State Board of Elections was scheduled to certify State Question 
755’s results on November 9, 2010). 
80 See Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (listing information about 
plaintiff, including that he defends Muslims’ civil rights in his capacity as Executive Director of the 
Council on American Islamic Relations and relaying that State Question 755’s supporters have 
described it as a “preemptive strike” against morals that threaten “Oklahoma’s Judeo-Christian 
values”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First 
Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 369 (2011) (stating that under the proposed Oklahoma 
Amendment, a contract for kosher meat will be enforced, while a contract for halal meat will not). 
81 See Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (listing defendants as the entire 
Board for Oklahoma’s State Board of Elections, and specifying Paul Ziriax, Agency Head for 
Oklahoma’s State Board of Elections, who has control over their operations, and Thomas Prince and 
Susan Turpen, board members with the legal authority to vote to certify an election). 
82 See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1. 
83 See U.S. CONST. ART. I.  
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Awad argued that if the election results were certified, his First 
Amendment rights would be violated.84  The violation would flow from 
condemnation of his religion by banning Sharia law,85 because his last will 
and testament, which incorporates aspects of Sharia law, would be 
invalidated.86  Awad’s last will and testament contained instructions for 
charitable distribution of his assets, which is a principle drawn from a 
teaching of Mohammed.87  Since State Question 755 would consider a 
teaching of Mohammed to be Sharia law, an Oklahoma court would have 
to consider Sharia law to distribute his assets.88  Thus, State Question 755 
would prohibit an Oklahoma court from probating Awad’s last will and 
testament.   
Awad contended that state courts would violate the First Amendment 
by becoming entangled with religion when trying to figure out what 
qualifies as Sharia law.89  He presented testimony to show that Sharia law 
is a religious tradition and not actual law.90  He argued that Sharia law 
imposes personal obligations based on faith, not legal obligations, and that 
the content of Sharia law differs by country.91  Sharia law, he further 
argued, directs Muslims to abide by the law of the land, so, for example, 
although in polygamy is permissible in Islam, it is not in the United States, 
                                                
84 See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1; See also, Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (noting that 
once Thomas Prince and Susan Turpen certify the results of the election, the results will have legal 
effect). 
85 See Complaint at 6, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (stating that certification of 
the election results will equal state disapproval of plaintiff’s faith, the ban on Sharia law implies there is 
something “nefarious about the Koran” and Mohammed’s teachings, the excessive entanglement with 
religion that certification of the results will lead to, is in violation of what the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment stands to protect); see also Domke on Commercial Arbitration, Part XVI. 
Interaction of Arbitration with Specialized Fields in the law, § 54:10. Particular issues in the 
Abrahamic/Mosaic religions—Islam, 2 DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 54:10 (relaying that both Mohammed 
and Moses, considered great lawmakers, are depicted in a freeze within the United States Supreme 
Court, but this equality in depiction is not mirrored by equality in perception of the American public, 
where Jewish laws are generally cited positively, and Islamic laws are viewed as “primitive and 
unpredictable”). 
86 Complaint at 7, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (indicating that plaintiff’s 
validly executed last will and testament directs his affairs to be handled in accordance with Sharia law, 
and even goes so far as to direct the testator to Qur’anic verses containing instructions for the purposes 
of executing a last will and testament in accordance with Islamic tradition; plaintiff argues that this 
validly executed will can no longer be considered in Oklahoma because it implicates and would require 
a judge to “consider” Sharia law.  Plaintiff’s uncertainty about when he will die and what will happen 
to his estate when in probate creates an immediate injury.  Lastly, for any will to be enforceable, it must 
eliminate any reference to his religion, which includes guidance for important matters such as 
inheritance and burial instructions.). 
87 Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 1301-02 (describing plaintiff’s religion, Islam, as relying on the Qur’an and Prophet 
Mohammed, and as providing the principles that guide plaintiff for every action he makes in his 
business or personal life).  
90 Id. at 1306. 
91 Id.  
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and thus Muslims in the U.S. do not engage in polygamy.92  The District of 
Oklahoma found that Sharia law “lacks a legal character and, thus, 
plaintiff’s religious traditions and faith are the only non-legal content 
subject to the judicial exclusion set forth in the amendment.”93  Thus, it 
found that State Question 755 inhibited plaintiff’s religion by disapproving 
of Islam.94  Also, because the court found that Sharia law was, in fact, not 
law, it further held that State Question 755 would lead to excessive 
government entanglement with religion, in violation of the First 
Amendment, because Oklahoma courts would have to determine the 
content of Sharia law, meaning the content of plaintiff’s religion.95   
In sum, Awad argued that the amendment violated the Establishment 
Clause by singling out the Muslim faith, requiring state courts to become 
unnecessarily entangled in religion, and disapproving of his religion.96  
There is not a single text that all Muslims regard as making up Sharia law, 
and so the state courts would have to examine many different religious 
texts to determine what texts will count as Sharia law.97  Awad further 
asserted that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment had been 
violated because the amendment discriminates against his religion, and 
fails strict scrutiny because it has no “compelling interest and is not 
narrowly tailored.”98 
The court determined that Awad had standing to bring his action and 
that he made a “preliminary showing that he will suffer an injury in fact,”99 
and granted a temporary restraining order and enjoined the defendants from 
certifying the election results.100   
                                                
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 1306-1307 
96 Id. at 3 (“In support, plaintiff cites to one of the authors of State Question 755, Representative Rex 
Duncan’s statement that ‘America was founded on Judeo-Christian principles’ and the amendment’s 
purpose was to ensure that Oklahoma’s courts are not used to ‘undermine those founding principles,’ 
and Representative Duncan’s further statement that the purpose of the measure was to establish a legal 
impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia law in the United States.”). 
97Id.; see also, DAMAD, supra note 1, at 1-2 (noting that the Qur’an has approximately 6000 verses, 
approximately 200 of which deal with law, approximately 80 of which deal with personal status laws. 
Personal status laws concern issues of family law, such as inheritance and marriage.  These laws are 
interwoven throughout the Qur’anic chapters that were revealed to Mohammed in Medina, as opposed 
to those chapters revealed in Mecca); DAMAD, supra note 1, at 4 (listing the main sources of Islamic 
law as the Qur’an, the hadiths (traditions and sayings of the prophet), “reasoning by analogy (qiyas), 
and “the consensus of the Islamic jurists or Ijma‘.”  The qiyas and Ijma‘ answer legal issues through 
interpretation and the Qur’an and hadiths); id. at 19-21 (listing the schools of Islamic Law as the Hanafi 
School, Maliki School, Shafi’i School, Hanbali School, Shi‘ite School, Zaidis, Imamiyah, and 
Ismal‘liyah). 
98 Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. 
99 Id. at 2. 
100 Id. at 4. 
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Following the November 9, 2010 decision granting the temporary 
restraining order and enjoining the defendants from certifying the election 
results,101 the District Court in Oklahoma found, after reviewing the briefs 
and hearing arguments, that Awad would suffer an injury in fact—a 
violation of his First Amendment rights.102  The court even went on to say, 
with strong language, that “it would be incomprehensible if, as Plaintiff 
alleges, Oklahoma could condemn the religion of its Muslim citizens, yet 
one of those citizens could not defend himself in court against his 
government’s preferment of other religious views.”103  The court also 
agreed with the plaintiff that because of the ban on considering Sharia law, 
Oklahoma courts would not be able to probate his will, which would make 
his will unenforceable.104  It granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
Oklahoma State Board of Elections from certifying the election results until 
it could rule on the merits of Awad’s claims.105 
The Oklahoma State Board of Elections appealed the case to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (the “Tenth 
Circuit”).106  The Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the District Court of 
Oklahoma abused its discretion when granting the preliminary 
injunction.107  It held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting the preliminary injunction and noted that the Plaintiff made a 
“strong showing on the substantial likelihood and balance-of-harms factors 
as the heightened standard requires.”108  As the case stands now, the Board 
of Elections for Oklahoma can file a petition to have the case reheard,109 or 
the Solicitor General for Oklahoma can file for certiorari in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.110  
Although the District Court in Awad v. Ziriax invalidated the ban on 
Sharia law, the ruling was based on constitutional issues and is not wholly 
                                                
101 Id. at 4. 
102 See id. at 1304. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 1308.  
106 See generally Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir.2012) [hereinafter Awad 2] (noting that 
the Board members asked for the case to be reviewed).  
107 Id. at 1116. 
108 Id. at 1132; Awad 2, 670 F.3d at 1129 (stating that under the Larson Test, which was applied to the 
Establishment Clause, “Appellants must show (1) a compelling government interest, and (2) that the 
amendment is “closely fitted” to that compelling interest” and the State of Oklahoma lacked a 
compelling state interest necessary to survive this test).  
109 Awad 2, 670 F.3d at 1116 (indicating that Awad v. Ziriax was heard before Judges O’Brien, McKay, 
and Matheson, not the entire panel of 10th circuit judges, so Wyrick, the Solicitor General for Oklahoma 
can file an appeal to have the case reheard en banc). 
110 Ismael T. Salam, “Save Our State” Amendment: Dead on Arrival, 17 PUB. INT. L. REP. 35, 41 (2011) 
(relaying that as of the time of the writing of this article, the Tenth Circuit had not yet rendered an 
opinion, however, as of the time of the writing of this Paper, the Tenth Circuit has rendered an opinion, 
but there has been no further action on the case). 
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indicative of a favorable view of Islamic law as a choice of law in the 
United States.  Similar proposals to the “Save Our State Amendment” have 
been considered in other states.111  The South Carolina Legislature 
proposed a very similar bill, which also mentioned Sharia law 
specifically.112  Arizona introduced a resolution prohibiting international 
law, which went so far as to declare that a judicial decision violating the 
ban on international law is grounds for impeachment and removal of the 
deciding judge.113 
  
B. In re Marriage of Ahmad and Sherifa Shaban v. Sherifa Shaban 
 
Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban involved a prenuptial agreement, 
which appeared to be governed by Islamic law.  The Shabans married in 
Egypt and subsequently lived in the United States for 17 years before 
deciding to divorce.114  Prior to their marriage, a prenuptial agreement was 
executed.115  The agreement was written in Arabic and signed by Mr. 
Shaban and his father-in-law.116  There were three English translations of 
the document, but according to the California Fourth District Court of 
Appeal (“Court of Appeal”), only the dowry arrangement “set forth any 
substantive matter.”117  At trial, an expert witness was prepared to testify 
that the parties' intended to have their marriage governed by Islamic law, 
including property division, based on the language of the document.118  
Introducing the expert witness invoked the parol evidence rule.119  The 
agreement stated that the marriage is a “[l]egal marriage concluded in 
                                                
111 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320 (2011).  
112 Id. (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the 
courts shall not consider Sharia law, international law, the constitutions, laws, rules, regulations, and 
decisions of courts or tribunals of other nations, or conventions, or treaties whether or not the United 
States is a party.”). 
113 Id. (Text of Arizona resolution) (“[Arizona] ‘shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate any 
case law or statute from another country or a foreign body or jurisdiction that is outside of the United 
States’ . . . [any judicial decision that violates this proscription is ‘null and void . . . and is grounds for 
impeachment and removal from office’ of the deciding judge.’”). 
114 Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 400 (2001).  
115 Id. at 400-401. 
116 Id. at 401 (relaying that the bride’s father had signed the agreement on her behalf as her 
“‘representative’”). 
117 Id.; see also id. at 401, n.1 (text from the prenuptial agreement) (“[t]he above legal marriage has 
been concluded in accordance with his Almighty God’s Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet to 
whom all God’s prayers and blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance from the two contracting 
parties.  The foregoing was concluded after the two parties had taken cognizance of the legal 
implications and after ascertaining that there are no legal or formal impediments preventing their 
marriage, and that the bride does not receive any salary from the Government and does not possess any 
funds exceeding L.E. 200, and that the bride and the bridegroom are of age.”).  
118 Id. at 401.  
119 Id. 
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Accordance with God’s Book and the precepts of His Prophet and with the 
mutual agreement of the husband and the wife’s representative [and that 
the] two parties . . . [have] taken cognizance of the legal implications [of 
the agreement].”120  Mr. Shaban asserted that this text referencing God 
indicates the parties’ intention to have their marriage governed by “‘Islamic 
law.’”121   
California community property law provides that acquisitions of 
property during a marriage become community property and should be 
divided among the parties.122  Conversely, Islamic law provides that 
property accumulated during a marriage, including earnings, remain the 
property of the person who purchased or earned the property.123  For the 
Shabans, the result of applying Islamic law would have meant that Mrs. 
Shaban would have no interest in Mr. Shaban’s medical practice or 
retirement accounts, but their real property, jointly held in both of their 
names, would be equally divided.124 
The Islamic law expert was not allowed to testify because the trial 
court judge concluded that the alleged prenuptial agreement was in 
actuality a marriage certificate, and California community property law 
was applied.125  Mr. Shaban appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing that 
the Islamic law expert should have been allowed to testify.126  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court decision.127  The court engaged in a lengthy 
discussion about the distinctions between the parol evidence rule and the 
Statute of Frauds,128 concluding that “there [was] no reason the same 
requirement that the writing evidence[,] with reasonable certainty[,] . . . 
should not also apply to prenuptial agreements.”129  It reasoned that the 
policy considerations supporting the Statute of Frauds were of the utmost 
importance when dealing with prenuptial agreements, because of the 
emotional impact of divorce, the triggering of prenuptial agreements, and 
the temptation for “selective memory” in divorce cases.130  The court stated 
that regardless of the parties’ desire to be regulated under Islamic law,131 
                                                
120 Id. at 403. 
121 Id. at 403-404. 
122 Id. at 404. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 Id. (stating that Mr. Shaban did note that if California law were found to govern, then the division of 
property as laid down by the trial court was correct). 
127 Id. at 411. 
128 See id. at 404-407. 
129 Id. at 406. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. at 406-407 (stating that the evidence for this desire is found in the term of their contract 
saying  “in Accordance with his Almighty God’s Holy Book and the rules of this Prophet’ and ‘two 
parties [having] taken cognizance of the legal implications”). 
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the contract terms indicating such a desire had too weak a relationship to a 
prenuptial agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.  It declined to rule on 
whether the alleged prenuptial agreement was against public policy, 
because the trial court did not err in excluding the parol evidence rule.132   
In the Shaban case, the Court of Appeal determined that applying 
Islamic law would be too abstract, and did not discuss whether the 
application of Islamic law in the Shabans’ case would be contrary to public 
policy.133  The court stated that it would be acceptable for a couple to 
choose a system of law to govern their prenuptial agreement, but found that 
choosing Islamic law would be equivalent to “[putting together a contract] 
without any agreement as to basic terms, [and agreeing] that a marriage 
will simply be governed by a given system of law and then hop[ing] that 
parol evidence will supply those basic terms.”134  The practical effect of the 
court’s holding in this case is a suggestion that Islamic law is too vague to 
be applied in the courts.   
 
C.  El-Farra v. Sayyed 
 
El-Farra v. Sayyed is an example of a case where the court declined 
to enforce an employment agreement governed by Islamic law.  The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the claims of Monir El-Farra.135  El-Farra was 
the Imam at the Islamic Center of Little Rock (“ICLR”).136  His 
employment contract stated that the ICLR could terminate his employment 
through a unanimous vote “on valid grounds according to Islamic 
Jurisdiction (Shari‘a).”137  El-Farra’s sermons were found to be offensive to 
members of the congregation, and on May 15, 2003, the ICLR sent him a 
letter saying his actions created “‘disunity and ‘fitna’138 among the 
community[.]’”139  The letter further warned El-Farra that if he did not 
improve, he would be terminated.140  On May 30, 2003, the ICLR sent El-
                                                
132 Id. at 403. 
133 Id. at 407. 
134 See id.  
135 El-Farra v. Sayyed, 365 Ark. 209, 210 (2006).   
136 Id. at 211. 
137 Id. (relaying that the Executive Committee and Board of Directions of the Islamic Center must have 
a unanimous vote to terminate his employment). 
138 ABOUT.COM, http://islam.about.com/od/glossary/g/fitna.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (“forces that 
cause controversy, fragmentation, scandal, chaos, or discord within the Muslim community, disturbing 
social peace and order.”). 
139 El-Farra, 365 Ark. at 211. 
140 Id.  
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Farra another letter, stating his actions were in “contradict[ion] with 
Islamic law.”141  El-Farra was eventually terminated on July 17, 2003.142   
After his termination, El-Farra filed a complaint against the ICLR 
alleging defamation, tortious interference with a contract, and breach of a 
contract.  The ICLR responded by arguing that under the First Amendment, 
the court could not hear the case and summary judgment should be 
granted.143  The circuit court stated that it could not hear El-Farra’s claims 
because doing so would be akin to a civil court placing limitations on 
individuals that religious institutions can choose as their representatives, 
which would violate the First Amendment.144  El-Farra claimed there was a 
breach of his contract,145 and the terms of his contract provided that he 
could be terminated “‘on valid grounds according to Islamic Jurisdiction 
(Shari‘a).’”146  The court found that any determination of El-Farra’s claim 
would involve intertwining itself in ecclesiastical issues, which would 
violate the First Amendment, and therefore, El-Farra was left without any 
remedy because the court would not look at Sharia law.147 
El-Farra also asserted a claim for defamation, based on what the 
letters sent to him by the Islamic Center claimed.148  To make a 
determination on whether the Islamic Center is guilty of defaming El-
Farra,149 the court would have to delve into Islamic law, which it claimed 
would be a violation of the First Amendment.150  The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas affirmed the lower court’s ruling, which held that there was 
insufficient subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.151  
The El-Farra case demonstrates a situation where the parties chose 
to have their contract governed by Islamic law, but the courts did not view 
Islamic law as a valid choice of law and therefore did not honor this choice.    




144 Id. at 212. 
145 Id. at 211. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. at 214-215 (“the First Amendment protects the act of decision rather than the motivation 
behind it; therefore, whether the termination of appellant was based on secular reasons or Islamic 
doctrine, this court will not involve itself in ICLR’s right to choose ministers without government 
interference.”). 
148 Id. at 211; see also id. at 215-216 (recounting that the letters sent by the Islamic Center to El-Farra 
accused him of “‘insubordination, disrespect, and lack of cooperation,’ of being ‘disruptive, to the 
community,’ of delivering khutbas (sermons) which showed ‘maleficence and deliberate interference in 
the operations of the EC,’ and of ‘creating disunity and ‘fitna’ among the community,’ . . . [and] of 
conduct which ‘contradicts the Islamic law,’ and of conduct which has ‘increasingly been unbecoming, 
insubordinate and disrespectful to the entire community.’”). 
149 Id. at 216 (indicating that to determine whether El-Farra has contradicted Islamic law, or is guilty of 
creating fitna in the community, the court will have to delve into interpret Islamic law). 
150 See id. at 216. 
151 See id. at 214. 
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D. National Group for Communications & Computers v. Lucent 
Technologies International 
 
In Nat’l Grp. for Commc’ns & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int’l, 
National Group for Communications and Computers Ltd. (“NGC”) sued 
Lucent Technologies International, Inc. (“Lucent”) over a 
telecommunications construction subcontract.152  American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (“AT&T”), the corporate predecessor of Lucent, had 
entered into a subcontract with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Post 
Telephone and Telegraph.153  The contract provided for a four-year 
relationship.154  The project, however, never came to fruition and the 
subcontract was ultimately terminated.155  The case concerned the proper 
award of damages under Saudi Arabian law for a breach of contract 
claim.156  Both parties chose Saudi Arabian law to apply, using the 
following language:  “This Subcontract is subject to the regulations in force 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  Interpretation and execution of the 
Subcontract and settlement of claims arising therefrom shall be subject to 
and in accordance with the said regulations.”157  Due to the choice-of-law 
provision, the New Jersey District Court had to determine the case under 
Saudi Arabian law.158  The court had jurisdiction to do this pursuant to Rule 
44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that when 
deciding issues of foreign law, a court ‘“may consider any relevant material 
or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The court’s determination 
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”159   
                                                
152 Nat’l Grp. for Commc’n & Computers  v. Lucent Tech. Int’l, 331 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (D. N.J. 
2004). 
153 Id.  
154 Id. (stating that “[p]laintiff was to implement the Roadside Emergency Telephone and Wayside 
Facilities Project (“RET/WSF Projects”) in Saudi Arabia by performing design and engineering 
services and installing emergency and pay telephones along Saudi Arabia’s highways and nearby 
facilities.”). 
155 Id.  
156 Id.. (noting that the parties agreed and the Court “assume[d]” that the subcontract was breached, and 
so the findings of fact only concerned damages under Saudi Arabian law); See also Charles P. 
Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
609, 635 (2006) (noting that Saudi Arabia has adopted the classical, un-codified, Islamic law). 
157 Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
158 Id..  
159 Id. at 293-294 (explaining that in making the determination on foreign law, courts may conduct its 
own research, request additional information from the parties, use experts and foreign material, and may 
even consider evidence that would be inadmissible at trial).  
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The court then analyzed Sharia law nonetheless.160  Saudi Arabia 
applies classic Islamic law, whereas other countries may only apply a few 
tenets of the faith and jurisprudential system.161  In applying Saudi Arabian 
law, the court examined various sources of the law; consulted Islamic law 
scholars; noted the infusion of Islam into the life of Saudi Arabian citizens; 
and acknowledged that Islamic law controls Saudi Arabia’s legal system.162  
The court then highlighted several ways in which the Saudi Arabian legal 
system differs from that of the United States.163  Importantly, there is no 
judicial precedent to bind judges and the opinions are not published in 
Saudi Arabia.164  In fact, judges in Saudi Arabia “‘must strive for the divine 
truth for each case that confronts him, without being bound by past 
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to which one must 
return once it is revealed.”165  
Under Islamic law, it is difficult to conduct some business 
transactions because of the prohibition of gharar,166 and as such, clients 
engaging in complex business transactions are often encouraged to exclude 
Sharia law as a choice of law.167  Here, the court determined that the parties 
were sophisticated in business and Islamic law.  Because they chose not to 
expressly exclude Sharia law in their contract, the court found it applied, 
noting “however uncompromising that application may be.”168  After 
finding Sharia law governed, the court then applied Saudi Arabian damages 
law to the case and determined that the damages plaintiff sought were 
contrary to Islamic law due to gharar.169  The court ultimately decided that 
                                                
160 Id.. 
161 See id. at 295. 
162 Id. at 294 (citing sections from the Basic Regulation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia quoted by the 
Court) (“Article 1: The religion [of Saudi Arabia] is Islam, its constitution is the Book of God Most 
High and the Sunna of His Prophet, may God bless him and give him peace.  Article 7: Rule in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia draws its authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunna of His 
Prophet.  These two are sovereign over this Regulation and all regulations of the state.  Article 48: The 
courts shall apply in cases brought before them the rules of the Islamic shari’a in agreement with the 
indications in the Book and the Sunna and the regulations issued by the ruler that do not contradict the 
Book or the Sunna.”). 
163 Id. at 295-297. 
164 See id. at 295. 
165 See id.; see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634 (stating that one of the reasons that Islamic 
law is harder to apply than Christian or Jewish law is because there is no authoritative text on Islamic 
law and expert witnesses cannot testify to a binding interpretation of Islamic law, unless an ijma has 
been reached, and since there are many schools of Islamic thought, adopting one over the other will 
likely prove unconstitutional).  
166 See Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (indicating that gharar, meaning risk, is prohibited and repugnant 
in Islam and the practical result is that courts in Saudi Arabia will not enforce uncertain or unknown 
sales); see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634 (noting that this prohibition comes from the 
hadith). 
167 See Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634 
168 Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
169 Id. at 298. 
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when applying Saudi Arabian law, looking at Islamic law texts, considering 
expert testimony, and examining Islamic law, it could not award damages 
to the plaintiff.170   
The Lucent decision indicates that there are situations where U.S. 
courts can and will apply Islamic law.171  Thus, despite arguments that this 
jurisprudential system is overly vague, U.S. courts are capable of 
understanding and applying Islamic law.172  In Lucent, both parties 
contracted for Saudi Arabian law to apply.173  As such, the court reasoned 
that it had to determine the case under this law, which required it to analyze 
Islamic law.174  According to Saudi Arabian law, in a claim for breach of 
contract, a plaintiff can only recover for the “actual physical harm to the 
property caused by the breach as well as out-of-pocket losses, and can be 
obtained only for losses which are precise, accurate and certain.”175  
Although it has been suggested that the Lucent case violates the First 
Amendment, no appeal has been filed to date.176  Some scholars argue that, 
to decide this case, the court had to make a determination of religious 
doctrine concerning gharar.  But since Saudi Arabian law is not codified, it 
could not make this determination based on a secular footing.177  The judge, 
some argue, played the role of qadi and rejected the plaintiff’s argument for 
lack of “‘supporting religious authority.’”178  
 
III. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
 
There are constitutional and public policy issues with respect to 
applying Islamic law in the United States.  The First Amendment provides 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”179  Critics of Islamic law fear 
that if it were allowed as a choice of law in the U.S. judicial system, the 
courts would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.180  
Another concern is that if Islamic law were applied in the arbitration 
                                                
170 Id. at 301. 
171 See Julio C. Colon, Choice of Law and Islamic Finance, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 429 (2011). 
172 See Symeonides, supra note 111, at 430. 
173 Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
174 See Colon, supra note 171, at 429. 
175 See Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (indicating that under Saudi Arabian law, a party actually cannot 
assume the risk of gharar). 
176 See Symeonides, supra note 111, at 430; see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 634. 
177 See Trumbull, supra note 156, at 636. 
178 See id. 
179 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
180 See Colon, supra note 171, at 427. 
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setting, the resulting arbitral awards may be vacated in court on  public 
policy grounds.181  There are, however, some legal sources available to 
assist courts tasked with these complicated choice-of-law situations, 
including applying Islamic law, which should allay such fears.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) is the main 
source.182   
The Restatement recognizes in its first section that issues arise that 
may implicate the laws of two separate states, and that these states may 
have conflicting laws, which makes it necessary to have a way to organize 
both sets of laws and come to a resolution.183  Section 6 of the Restatement 
provides guidelines for choice-of-law principles.184  Specifically, Section 6 
provides that, inter alia, when a state does not have its own statutory 
directive to follow on choice of law, the factors relevant to the choice of the 
applicable rule include:  1) international and interstate system needs; 2) 
relevant policies of the forum; 3) relevant policies and interests of other 
interested states in the determination of the particular issue; 4) protection of 
justified expectations; 5) basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law; 6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and 7) ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied.185  The comments to 
this section note that the protection of justified expectations is an important 
tenet of choice of law rules.186  Where parties have chosen a particular type 
of law, such as Islamic law, and are expecting to be bound by that law, it is 
unfair to “hold a person liable under the local law of one state when he had 
justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of another 
state.”187  Of course this tenet does not apply when the individual has 
molded his conduct to conform to the laws of another state whereby such 
conduct is contrary to public policy.  However, where the parties choose 
Islamic law and there is no public policy issue, there is no reason that 
Islamic law should not be applied, such as in a contract case. 
Another important factor emphasized by Section 6 is the 
understanding of the basic policies behind a given law.188  Some courts 
have argued that Islamic law is vague and unpredictable because of the 
different schools of legal thought.189  Yet given the number of cases where 
                                                
181 See id. (noting that there have been instances in arbitration of Islamic finance where a challenge of 
the award was attached on First Amendment grounds). 
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971). 
183 See id. 
184 Id. at § 6. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at § 6 cmt. g. 
187 Colon, supra note 171, at § 6 cmt. g. 
188 Id. at § 6 cmt. h.  
189 See, e.g., Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 400 (2001). 
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courts have successfully applied Islamic law,190 it is clear that concerns of 
adequately understanding Islamic law should not be a bar in selecting it as 
a choice of law.   
The Restatement also addresses which law is to govern in the 
absence of effective choice by the parties.191  This Section applies to 
Islamic law, where parties choose to apply Islamic law generally, but fail to 
indicate which school of thought they planned to follow.  Section 188 holds 
that where the parties have not made an effective choice of law, the 
“contacts to be taken into account in applying principles of Section 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of 
contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of 
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) 
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties.”192  The effect of this section on the choice of law, 
including Islamic law, is that where parties intend to be bound by Islamic 
law but are silent on the school of thought of such law, courts can “fill in 
the gap” by using the above factors to determine which school of thought is 
to apply.  Of course, applying Section 188 will not work in every case 
where Islamic law is said to govern, or when some contract terms are 
substantially unclear.  Although, if courts at least attempted to apply 
Islamic law, it is likely that some parties contracting for Islamic law would 
be successful in having this choice of law provision upheld, rather than the 
case being dismissed.   
 Section 187 of the Restatement concerns the law of the state chosen 
by the parties.193  Generally, it provides that if parties have chosen a 
particular law to apply, then courts should apply that law.  Further, even if 
parties have not indicated what law they want to apply, but have inserted 
terms in their contract that lead the court to conclude that the parties 
intended a particular law to apply, the court can apply that particular law.194  
In regard to Islamic law, if the parties provide that Islamic law applies, but 
do not indicate whether they intended to be bound by the laws of a specific 
country governed by Islamic law, classical Islamic law, or a particular 
school of Islamic law, courts can examine the contract terms to find which 
area of Islamic law the parties intended to apply.  In addition, this Section 
provides for a public policy exception.195  Specifically, if application of the 
                                                
190 See Nat’l Grp. Commc’n & Computers  v. Lucent Tech. Int’l, 331 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294-98 (D. N.J. 
2004). 
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at § 187 
194 Id. at § 187 cmt. a. 
195 Id. at § 187 (2)(b). 
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chosen law violates the fundamental public policy of a state, which has a 
greater interest in the action, the law shall not apply.196  There are indeed 
instances where application of Islamic law in American courts would lead 
to a result contrary to the fundamental public policy of the United States.  
Accordingly, this section exempts the application of Islamic law where it 
runs counter to the public policy of the United States.  
 
IV. A Solution: Islamic Arbitration 
 
Islamic law is currently one of the top three major legal systems in 
the world.197  Its application in U.S. courts has been slow, at best, due to 
constitutional issues and instances of social and institutional prejudice.198  
Nonetheless there are still parties in the United States as well as 
internationally that seek to have their disputes adjudicated within the U.S. 
under Sharia law.  A solution to this issue has slowly been developing 
under the umbrella of Islamic arbitration.  Indeed, Islamic law has a long 
history of arbitration, or tahkim, which dates back to pre-Islamic time when 
tribal leaders conducted arbitration.199  Religious arbitration tribunals 
already exist, such as the Beth din, the Jewish rabbinical arbitration 
court.200  Notwithstanding, some argue that enforcement of religious 
arbitration is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment; although courts have held that enforcing an award rendered 
by the Beth din does not require entangling themselves in religion by 
addressing the underlying merits of the case.201 
Arbitration is a mode of resolving disputes, which allows parties to 
choose a particular law to apply, and to have their issues resolved privately, 
outside of the court system.202  It is conducted by arbitration tribunals, 
which have jurisdiction once parties submit to their jurisdiction pursuant to 
a valid arbitration clause in their contract.203  Often, parties submit to 
                                                
196 Id. 
197 See Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 565, 566 (2006).  
198 Id. at 568 (noting that there is a view in the United States that Islamic law is unsophisticated and 
inherently defective). 
199 Id. at 589. 
200 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2011). 
201 See id. at 1244; see also Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1113 (D. Colo. 1999); Elmora 
Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 731 (N.J. 1991). 
202 See, e.g., Kutty, supra note 197, at 569. 
203 See id.  
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arbitration because it is faster and less expensive than the traditional 
litigation route and allows greater flexibility regarding choice of law.204  
The process of establishing Islamic arbitration in the United States 
has already begun, and the Fiqh Council of North America is one such 
example.205  This organization provides determinations based on Islamic 
legal issues and is responsible for appointing arbitrators and confirming 
that the arbitrators’ decisions comply with Islamic law.206  Moreover, the 
Council of Masajid of the United States resolved to establish Islamic 
arbitration tribunals in numerous large metropolitan areas in the United 
States, although none have been established to date.207  
The development of Islamic arbitration will not lead to rulings 
contrary to public policy because courts have the mechanisms to vacate 
arbitration awards in such cases.208  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has even stated that “‘[t]he public’s interests in confining the scope 
of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless 
the judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers whether to 
enforce such agreements,’” explaining that awards contrary to public policy 
are void.209  Therefore, vacatur can serve as a check on religious arbitration. 
Religious arbitration tribunals have been successful in the Jewish 
community.  If the Muslim community models arbitration tribunals after 
examples such as the Beth din, there is no reason to believe that Islamic 
arbitration tribunals will not be successful as well.  The mold has already 
been set.  In 1925, written arbitration agreements were made valid by the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).210  
There are various grounds under which an arbitration award may be 
vacated, both under the FAA and state arbitration statutes.  Two of these 
grounds are where a tribunal failed to follow due process and where an 
award violates public policy.211  
                                                
204 See id. at 560-570. 
205 Helfand, supra note 200, at 1250. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. (discussing the importance to Muslims of establishing Islamic arbitration tribunals and giving the 
example of a recent fatwa issued by the Fiqh Council stating that Muslims must try to resolve disputes 
according to Islamic law). 
208 Id. at 1256. 
209 Id.; but see id. (“the grounds on which a court can vacate or modify an arbitration award are 
generally limited by statute to cases where the court finds ‘that the rights of the party were prejudiced 
by corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; partiality of an arbitrator; that the rights of 
the arbitrator exceeded his power or failed to make a final and definite award; or a procedural failure 
was not waived.’”). 
210 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious 
Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. L. & RELIGION 379, 388 (2009-2010) (FAA 
provision) (“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”).  
211 Id. at 390. 
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Regarding the due process ground, a court will want to confirm that 
the arbitration comports with the basic requirements of fairness and due 
process, and that the parties entered the arbitration knowingly and 
voluntarily.212  There are various procedural routes that arbitrators in 
Jewish tribunals will take and these different roads are set out in advance, 
so that the parties know what to expect.213  Interestingly, a beth din may 
apply only Jewish law, or in the alternative, a combination of Jewish and 
secular law.214  An example of where public policy and Jewish law conflict 
is in cases where the beth din have refused a party the right to a lawyer.215  
In such a case, American courts will vacate the award.216  Jewish law 
discourages the use of lawyers because they are seen as pursuing their 
client’s case only and not justice as a whole in the case.217  Of course, this 
Jewish law is in direct conflict with the core of the American legal system, 
where representation by an attorney is almost a fundamental right.218   
Regarding the public policy ground, courts will vacate a beth din 
award if the award is contrary to public policy or “irrational.”219  In 
addition, courts have determined some issues as non-justiciable by beth 
dins because of public policy, such as wills, child support, and custody.220  
However, if a beth din does make a ruling on a child custody case, and the 
court finds that it is in the best interest of the child, the order will not be 
vacated.221 
The beth din mold can be applied to Islamic arbitration tribunals.222  
If the Islamic tribunals structure themselves similarly to beth dins, where 
parties can voluntarily agree to bring their cases to the Islamic tribunals,223 
where the tribunals set basic ground rules,224 where the ground rules are 
                                                
212 Id. at 393. 
213 Bambach, supra note 210, at 393-394 (“arbitrations can take various procedural forms, including 
‘compromise or settlement related to Jewish law (p’shara korva l’din),’ or a hearing ‘either according 
to Jewish law as it is understood by the arbitrators (din torah) or compromise (p’shara) alone.”). 
214 Id. at 394. 
215 Id. at 395. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. (noting that under Jewish law, lawyers are “depicted in halachic sources as . . . pursuing only 
[their] client’s cases, not pursuing justice itself, in conflict with the Biblical commandment ‘tzedek 
tzedek tirdof’ –meaning justice, justice, thou shalt pursue.”) 
218 See id.  
219 Id. at 399. 
220 Id. (noting that most states argue that states’ parens patriae role cannot be assumed). 
221 Id. at 399-400. 
222 Id. at 403. 
223 Id. at 406 (explaining that a voluntary agreement for arbitration is a requirement for civil courts to 
review the agreements and that the arbitration agreements should always be in writing and be clear 
about what is going to be arbitrated). 
224 Id. at 408 (stating that there are many different schools of thought and interpretation of Islamic law, 
and the tribunals should set ground rules for how to deal with this inherent issue that will come up). 
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followed,225 and where awards are not against public policy or irrational, 
Muslims may be successful in having their claims adjudicated by an 




It is possible that the use of Islamic law in U.S. courts has been slow 
to develop because Muslim immigration to the United States is relatively 
new, only occurring in large numbers as of the 1960s.227  As more Muslims 
come to the U.S., and the use of Islamic law and custom becomes more 
widespread, hopefully U.S. courts will become more accustomed to 
analyzing, applying, and enforcing Islamic law as a choice of law in private 
contracts.  
Islamic arbitration tribunals are another mechanism through which 
parties can have their contracts and disputes resolved pursuant to Islamic 
law.  In this context, Jewish arbitration tribunals serve as a useful example 
for future Islamic arbitration tribunals.228  As the use of Islamic arbitration, 
or tahkim, grows in the U.S., the hope is that parties will increase their use 
of such tribunals and U.S. courts will become accustomed to enforcing 
arbitral awards rendered by such tribunals. 
  
                                                
225 Id. at 409 (noting that arbitrators should not be biased in their decisions, which can happen in a small 
community). 
226 Id. at 410 (knowing that awards contrary to public policy or irrational will not be confirmed by the 
courts, the tribunals should avoid deciding cases this way). 
227 Id. at 381. 
228 See id. at 411. 
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